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Why did Antonio agree to give Shylock a pound of his flesh in theMerchant of Venice? Why was Shylock unable to get his pound of
flesh? Parties to a contract are allowed to determine their obligations but
cannot freely determine the consequences of breach in the event of non-
performance. Such is the paradox in the law of obligations. Virtually every
modern contract contains a liquidated damages clause and common law
jurisdictions strive to ensure that such clauses do not offend the rule
against penalties. This paper examines the principle of contractual freedom
within the narrower context of liquidated damages and penalty clauses.
It revisits the principles of the law of penalties as expounded in the classic
case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co.
Ltd, and considers how well they have fared after a century. In making
this evaluation, particular attention is paid to English, Australian and
Nigerian law. There are issues thrown up by the rigid dichotomy between
liquidated damages and penalties and the extent to which commercial
partners can negotiate around them. As commercial contracts become
more complex and multi-jurisdictional, clarity, certainty and security of
transactions have become more fundamental to commercial dealings. This
article finds that the dichotomy between penalty and liquidated damages
has not only become irrelevant, it also undermines these fundamentals.
Arguments made in favour of the dichotomy are self-defeating and
confusing. Judicial attempts to bring the penalty rule in consonance with
commercial realities also come with problems of their own. Therefore,
an abolition of the dichotomy is advocated.  This article proposes that in
place of the existing unjustifiable paternalistic approach, all agreed
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damages should be prima facie valid, subject to clear cases of unequal
bargaining power and economic oppression.




There is clearly a tension between the fundamental principle that partiesare allowed to agree the terms of their contracts within the bounds
of the law on the one hand, and the prohibition of penalty clauses in
contracts on the other hand. Virtually every form of agreement contains
a provision for agreed damages. The common law, however, draws a line
between sums calculated and agreed by parties in good faith as a true
estimation of loss in the event of default (liquidated damages) and sums
intended to coerce the other party’s performance or deter them from
defaulting (penalties).
In contrast, civil law regimes generally enforce fixed sums, whether
they are intended to approximate damages or deter breach.1  The common
law position on penalties is taken to have been authoritatively expounded
in the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage & Motor
Co. Ltd (Dunlop’s case).2 In that case, the basic principle was laid down
that where parties to a contract agree a stipulated sum as damages in the
event of breach, the courts would only uphold such amount if indeed it
is a genuine pre-estimate. A short examination of the facts of this case is
apposite: the appellants, who were manufacturers of motor tyres, covers,
and tubes, supplied these goods to the respondents. The respondents
bound themselves not to tamper with the marks on the goods, not to sell
to any co-operative society at less than the appellants’ current list prices
and to pay the sum of five pounds by way of liquidated damages for
good sold in breach of the agreement. The respondents sold a tyre cover
to a co-operative society below the current list price. In an action for
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breach of contract, the court held that the stipulated sum was liquidated
damages.
Lord Dunedin succinctly formulated the propositions, which he
considered deducible from a wealth of authorities.3 His propositions are
re-visited in concluding this paper as they form the basis of our conclusion
that the dichotomy between penalty and liquidated damages has now
lost its value, if it ever had any. The propositions have become difficult
to apply to modern commercial dealings and different jurisdictions,
including Nigeria, that have felt bound by them for decades now seek
more realistic approaches to making sense of the rule. Judges have
developed in recent times a new test of “commercial justification” but
this test creates other challenges.4 For one, it is particularly elusive for an
area of law that demands certainty, clarity and security. It is no different
from tests of “reasonableness” and “unconscionability” and is, therefore,
susceptible to all the arguments that such tests have been subjected to.5
One central aim of this paper is to address the problems created by the
rule against penalty in commercial contracts. The dichotomy has been
rightly described as a historical accident;6 moreso because it is selective
in application and can be disruptive of legitimate bargains.
This article is in five sections, this introduction being the first. Section
2 gives a historical account of the penalty rule and critically examines the
explanations often provided for the dichotomy between penalty and
liquidated damages provisions. Section 3 deals with the unsolved puzzle
that is the breach limitation. It argues that the stipulation that a penalty
clause can only be one triggered by a breach produces illogical and
inconsistent results that, arguably, have no place in the modern law of
contract. We examine how attempts by the Australian High Court to
avoid the undesirable results created by the breach limitation falls into a
similar kind of mischief as they try to prevent. Section 4 aggregates
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arguments about the continued relevance of the dichotomy between
penalty and liquidated damages. This involves critical analysis of Lord
Dunedin’s propositions in Dunlop’s case. Section 5 concludes that an
abolition of the dichotomy is the best approach for reconciling commercial
realities with the common law in this area.
2.  THE PENALTY RULE: RATIONALE
Many reasons account for the common law distinction drawn between
liquidated damages and penalties. The history of relief against penalties
under the common law has been traced (although not without some
disagreement) to the relief given by the courts against penal bonds.7 Penal
bonds contained a promise to pay a certain sum of money but where a
specified obligation is met, the promise becomes void. Such bonds are
now rarely ever used in their historical form but this paper discusses how
contractual parties have created modern variants of the penal bond.
Prominent scholars like Peter Birks have also attempted to explain the
rationale of the rule as an attempt to protect parties from the systematically
optimistic nature of humans regarding the future.8 A nature that would
make them agree to be bound by excessive penalty clauses that they cannot
or do not intend to honour. They do this because they are so confident
that they can meet their obligations under the contract – very much like
Shylock’s pound of flesh in The Merchant of Venice.9
This explanation suffers from severe over-inclusiveness. It fails to
tell us why we do not attempt to protect parties from this innate optimism
under the general law. Why would we specifically apply such reasoning
to penalty clauses? Furthermore, we could argue that parties agree to be
bound by penalties because they bank on judicial intervention to obtain
relief from these obligations. The effect of this would be that they enter
into agreements which they have no intention of honouring. Whether
such parties are deserving of the law’s protection is debatable.10
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A better rationale for the rule against penalties is that penalties oust
the jurisdiction of the court to determine the damages payable by the
defaulting party. There are guiding principles for making this
determination and rather than fulfil the compensatory aim of damages,11
penalties seek to terrorise and punish. Unlike cases of tort, punishment
has never been the goal in the law of contract. There is a deep-seated
reluctance to view the breach of a contract as a morally reprehensible
conduct deserving of punishment under the common law.12 This is the
same idea that underlies the absence of a general duty of good faith in
English contract law.13
In defence of liquidated damages, a genuine pre-estimate of loss is
considered to fulfil this compensatory aim and, therefore, acceptable. For
this reason, it is taken to adopt the courts’ method assessment thereby
saving judicial time and avoiding the risk of inaccurate assessment. Driving
this argument to its logical conclusion will suggest that the liquidated
sum must always be identical to what the court would have awarded
using the usual principles. We will, however, discover in section 2.1 below
that liquidated damages are not free from controversy in this regard.
2.1 Recoverable Losses
There are certain losses that are not recoverable under the general law of
damages. Principles such as mitigation, remoteness and contributory
negligence limits the amount of damages that the court may award to the
non-defaulting party.14  It is, however, not clear if and how parties in
their determination of liquidated damages can factor in these issues. This
is because liquidated damages are pre-determined and, as Lord Dunedin
emphasized in Dunlop’s case, the relevant time is the time of contracting.15
Thus, even though liquidated damages may be a genuine attempt by parties
to pre-estimate loss, there is a real possibility that the sum bears no
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resemblance to what the court, if left to decide, would have awarded as
damages. This is as a result of the application of limiting factors such as
mitigation, remoteness and contributory negligence. The question then
becomes whether it is an acceptable result for the courts to enforce
liquidated damages clauses even though such sums would ordinarily have
been subject to these limiting factors. Whether this may be considered an
acceptable result or not would depend on the perceived utility of limiting
factors in contract law.
Remoteness is an established principle, which protects a defaulting
party from bearing losses that are unforeseeable, uncontemplated or have
no direct connection with the breach.16  The principle is strictly applied
in contract law such that there must be serious possibility of the
occurrence of the type of loss for which compensation is being sought.17
Mitigation of damages, on the other hand, is based on the idea that
the claimant should be efficient after the defendant’s breach. He should
neither refuse to make efforts to minimize his loss where possible nor go
ahead to incur unreasonably high expenses.18 The claimant is simply
required to act reasonably. Thus, for instance, Lord Hoffmann stated in
South Australia Asset Management Corp v. York Montague Ltd
“SAAMCO” that “where there is an available market, any additional loss
which the buyer suffers through not having immediately bought
equivalent goods at the market price is prima facie caused by his own
change of mind”.19
The remoteness principle only comes into play after the breach has
occurred and the court has to determine the recoverable loss. This means
that parties are unlikely to give this principle much consideration at the
time of contracting. The same reasoning applies to the principle of
mitigation as by its very nature, mitigation only becomes possible after
the breach has occurred.
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Thus, the relevant question is whether these losses, which are
ordinarily not recoverable because of the principles mentioned above
should be given a free pass when the court is dealing with liquidated
damages; or whether the court should still go ahead to apply the limiting
principles as they would in other cases. It is not clear from the cases what
the position of the law is. In the English case of Robophone Facilities Ltd
v. Blank,20 Lord Diplock expressed the opinion, without clearly deciding,
that these restrictions should not apply to liquidated damages. The merit
to this position is that if they were to be applied, whatever judicial time
and effort is saved by upholding a liquidated damages clause will be lost
in the process of trying to apply these limitations.
Burrows proposed a selective approach. He argues that while the
principle of remoteness may be circumvented, the courts should always
apply the principle of mitigation to liquidated damages.21 This he considers
vital in promoting efficiency and discouraging waste by parties.22 There
may be some justification for this proposition. It is agreed that contracting
parties should not be allowed to act unreasonably to the detriment of the
other party after the breach has occurred. On the whole, the dichotomy
between penalties and liquidated damages could be easily rendered
redundant by the application of these limiting factors to all agreed
damages. The result of this would be that damages would more often
than not consistently reflect the recoverable losses of the parties.
Application of the remoteness principle to a penalty clause, for instance,
will inadvertently result in a reduction of the sum to better reflect loss
that bears a closer connection to the breach.
Notably, the English Law Commission expressed a contrary view
and provisionally stated that these two limitations should be applied to
liquidated damages.23 While the controversy surrounding recoverable
losses does not directly impact on the central debate in this paper, it is
the writer’s view that limiting factors should not be applied to agreed
damages clauses in whatever form. This is in line with the principle of
certainty in commercial contracts, which this article strongly advocates.
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2.2 Actual Loss Versus Agreed Damages
Another issue worth considering is the possibility of variations between
the agreed damages and the actual loss. Where a claimant’s loss is in fact
greater than a penalty, is it open to such claimant to say that the sum is
not enforceable because it is a penalty and so should be struck down by
the court? The House of Lords left this question open in Cellulose Acetate
Silk Co Ltd v Widnes Foundry.24 There are different ways of viewing this
problem. One is to say that the relevant period is when the contract was
made. The penalty clause being invalid at that time should still be held
invalid even if it turns out to be advantageous to the defaulting party.
Another view is that the reason penalty clauses are held invalid in the
first place is to prevent unfairness to the defaulter. Where there is however
no such injustice, there is no reason why a penalty clause should not be
upheld. Hudson25 persuasively argues in support of this viewpoint by
pointing out that where the claimant’s loss is greater than liquidated
damages, he is confined to the liquidated sum so to allow him to recover
more where the loss is greater than the penalty treats a claimant (who has
acted wrongly by inserting a penalty clause) better than one who has put
in a genuine pre-estimate. This is yet another avoidable confusion created
by the liquidated damages/penalty dichotomy.
3.  THE BREACH LIMITATION: DISTINCTION
WITHOUT A DIIFFERENCE?
The present position of the law is that a sum can only be struck down as
an invalid penalty if triggered by breach.26 Consequently, relief against
penalty is only applicable where the sum is payable on a breach of contract.
If the sum is payable upon any other event such as termination in
accordance with the terms of the contract, it is not open to the court to
declare the sum a penalty. The problem here is that the distinction between
money payable on a breach event and that payable on a non-breach event
could be more apparent than real. Parties can by creative drafting make
what is in essence a penalty look more like an agreed sum, or a bonus for
early completion thereby producing a different outcome and
circumventing the law.
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The question then becomes more of how well one is able to make an
appropriate formulation of the contractual terms rather than what the
substantive effect of the clause is. Lord Denning expressed strong
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v.
Bridge27 where a stipulated sum was payable in the event of breach or
lawful termination. The hirer of a car under a hire-purchase agreement
with a finance company, having made an initial payment equal to £105,
paid one monthly instalment on the total hire-purchase price of £482:10s.,
and then informed the company in writing that he could not keep up the
payments and returned the car to them. Clause 6 of the agreement
provided that: “The hirer may at any time terminate the hiring by giving
notice of termination in writing to the owners, and thereupon the
provisions of clause 9 shall apply.” Clause 9 provided that, if the agreement
was for any reason terminated before the vehicle became the hirer’s
property, the hirer was to pay such further sums as may be necessary to
make the rentals paid and payable equal to two-thirds of the hire-purchase
price. The court held, on the basis that the hirer did not exercise his option
under clause 6 but was in breach of his obligations, that the amount alleged
due under clause 9 was not a genuine pre-estimate of damages, but a
penalty. The owner could not therefore rely on clause 9.
The curious thing about this decision is that it seems to suggest that
if the contract had been terminated under clause 6, the courts would have
upheld the sum, the difference lying squarely in the mode of termination.
Although Lord Devlin pointed out that clause 9 could not be a sham (as
it was) for one purpose and genuine for another, Lords Morton, Radcliffe
and Viscount Simonds all agreed that the hirer did not exercise his option
under clause 6 (in the absence of breach) and further suggested that the
hirer would not have been entitled to relief had that been the case.
Lord Denning disagreed with this outcome. In his words, “The courts
have power to grant relief against the sum contained in “minimum
payment” clauses, no matter for what reason the hiring is terminated. To
act otherwise would mean that equity commits itself to an absurd paradox,
it will grant relief to a man who breaks his contract but will penalise the
man who keeps it”.28
There is a lot of merit in Lord Denning’s famous observation in this
case, it seems very incongruous that the party in breach is granted relief
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while a party that terminates the contract in line with the contract is left
worse off, no matter that the sum was indeed excessive. Edwin Peel29 also
recognizes this unwelcome result: that the payer may be in a better
position if he breaches the contract (so that relief may be granted) than if
he lawfully exercises an option under the contract which requires the
same payment to be made, without scope for any relief.30 For Burrows,
Lord Denning’s approach is commendable because the rationale for
imposing sums payable on an event other than breach is not so different
from the purpose served by the penalty clause.31 It is either to pre-estimate
loss caused by the event or to preclude the claimant from pursuing the
event. Drawing a distinction between the two, therefore, seems pointless.
The English Law Commission lent support to Lord Denning’s
approach by recommending that the court should be able to deal with
such clauses in the same way, whether or not they come into operation
by breach.32 It is interesting to see how this issue has been addressed in
Nigeria. In the case of Oyeneyin v Akinkugbe,33 Adekeye JSC of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria stated that penalty clauses are sanctions which
are imposed “in the event of allowing a situation that could be prevented
from happening”. With this blanket definition, it is not clear that Nigerian
courts are strictly bound by the breach limitation. This is because there
may be other events, which are not necessarily breach events, that fall
under this wide categorization of “things that could have been prevented”.
His Lordship went further to state that in enforcing a penalty clause in a
contract, one has to consider the special circumstances of the particular
case.34
The counter argument to this position is that given the intrusion of
the penalty rule into the fundamental concept of contractual freedom, it
is not sensible to extend it unnecessarily. Unnecessary because there is
no liability to pay damages for an event that does not amount to a breach,
the stipulated sum does not, therefore, oust the compensatory aim of
damages.35  The problem with accepting the recommendation of the Law
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Commission and other similar views is that it may be akin to an acceptance
of a wider proposition that the court has a general jurisdiction to rewrite
contracts when they consider the terms harsh or disadvantageous to either
of the parties.36 Jurisprudential experience would reveal that couching
principles in such wide and general terms often results in arbitrary results.
There have been suggestions on how to limit the scope of these powers
and they are considered in section 3.1 below.
Traditionally, sums payable upon the occurrence of non-breach events
have been treated like an agreed sum.There may have been some confusion
as to the nature of the liquidated damages and the similarities they share
with the remedy of the award of an agreed sum.37 One of such similarities
is that they are both common law remedies. There is, indeed, a
fundamental difference, which justifies a completely different analysis of
the two remedies.  An action for an award of an agreed sum is one for the
contract price38 rather than damages for breach.39 Liquidated damages,
on the other hand, are an agreed remedy for breach of contract. The
liquidated damages/penalty analysis simply does not apply to debt claims.
So, in Jervis v. Harris,40 a lessee covenanted to maintain the demised
premises in good tenantable condition and the lease authorized the
landlord to enter the premises to view the state of repair.
In default, the landlord could do the work and recover the costs and
expenses from the tenant. It was held that where a lease provided by
specific covenants for repairs to be carried out by the lessee in default of
which the lessor was entitled on notice to enter the property and carry
out repairs at the lessee’s expense, a claim by the lessor to recover moneys
expended in making good a want of repair arising from the lessee’s breach
of the repairing covenant was a claim for debt and not a claim for damages
for breach of covenant. The doctrine of penalties did not apply to a claim
in debt. Nigerian courts have also drawn this distinction. In G.M.O.N v.
Akputa,41  the Supreme Court stated that a line must be drawn between a
liquidated demand for a specific debt sum and liquidated damages. It was
held that when the amount in question is ascertained or capable of being
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ascertained without further investigation, it is a liquidated sum which is
distinguishable from damages stipulated by parties as payable on breach.
3.1 Primary, Collateral and Alternative Stipulations: Lessons
from Australia
The limitation of relief against penalties triggered by breach events is
firmly established under the common law. The general acceptance of this
principle is what makes the judgment of the High Court of Australia in
Andrews v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,42 something
of a lesson in legal history. The court opined in that case that there is no
basis for the proposition that the courts’ power to grant relief against a
penalty is limited to sums payable as a consequence of the breach of a
contractual obligation. The factual background of the case is interesting
and of universal appeal. It is connected to the validity of bank charges
imposed on bank customers who have exceeded the authorised limit on
borrowing.43 The issue of excessive bank charges has raised a lot of dust
in many jurisdictions. Nigeria is not exempted from the dissatisfaction
of consumers with the different charges imposed by banks but
unfortunately and unlike in Australia and England, there has not been
active judicial and legislative44 response.
The opposition to extortionate bank charges under common law has
been on the ground that the sums are penalties as they do not represent a
genuine pre-estimate of the bank’s loss, and that they are unconscionable
and arbitrary. The judicial approach has however been to apply the breach
limitation in these cases. Thus, in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National
Plc,45 Andrew Smith J., at first instance, found that that no breach was
committed by a customer who exceeded the authorized borrowing limit
and therefore relief against penalty did not apply. This has remained the
position of the law for long time.46
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 The High Court of Australia in Andrews v. Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group Ltd, therefore, stands apart in its declaration
that there is no basis for the distinction between breach and non-breach
events. It has been mentioned that the skilled draftsman all too easily
evades the breach limitation. Using Peel’s example, D promises to
construct a building for £1 million; if he promises to complete by January
1, 2014, and agrees to pay £50,000 for each month by which he is late.
Such payment may be challenged as a penalty; if he makes no promise
about the time of completion, but the parties agree that he shall be paid £1
million for completion on or before January 1, or £950,000 for completion
after January 1 but before February 1, or £900,000 for completion after
February 1 but before March 1, and so on. There is no scope for the rule to
apply because there is no breach by way of late completion.47
While many judicial pronouncements and commentaries have
criticized the breach limitation and the unacceptable results it could yield,
one must recognize that there is some utility to be derived from the breach
limitation; it helps to set important boundaries without which the width
and depth of the penalty rule will be unknown. As the Law Commission
puts it, it should not be the case that every price payable under a contract
should be subject to judicial control.48 This problem of boundaries is what
the Andrews case ultimately seeks to address and what the case is truly
remarkable for. The case pushes forward the idea of primary, alternative and
collateral stipulations. Rather than ask whether the sum is payable on breach
or not, the relevant question becomes whether as a matter of construction,
the parties have structured their bargain in the form of primary and collateral
stipulations, or in the form of alternative stipulations.49
The recommendation of the Australian High court is to limit the rule
against penalties to those stipulations which can be identified as collateral
to, and security for, the satisfaction of a primary stipulation while
alternative stipulations are to be upheld by the courts.50 This echoes the
suggestions of Lord MacDermott CJ in Lombank Ltd v. Kennedy51 that
the essential question is whether the relevant stipulation is calculated to
secure performance.52
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One can immediately see the issues that the collateral/alternative
stipulation approach breeds. Firstly, it merely replaces the breach/non-
breach analysis with a different kind of analysis – one which is just as
susceptible to avoidance by clever draftsmanship. Secondly, the distinction
between an obligation, which is collateral to a primary obligation and
one that is an alternative, is not always easy to draw. Two examples
illustrate this point: (a) In exchange for a motorbike, A promises B that
he will clean B’s windows on Monday or, failing that pay B 500, 000;
(b) In exchange for a motorbike, A promises B that he will pay B 500,000,
or in the alternative clean B’s windows on Monday.  In (a), the obligation
to pay 500,000 is clearly collateral to the window cleaning while in (b) it
is an alternative stipulation.53  Thirdly, there is a strong tendency that the
“substance over form” principle of equity will be watered down if the
courts do not take special care in applying this principle.
Using the illustration, it is clear that the two clauses only differ in
form but their effects are essentially the same. In both clauses, the
obligation to pay 500,000 is still excessive and there is no clear reason
why a party should be able to get away with it just because it is couched
in alternative rather than collateral form.  The case of Interfoto Picture
Library Ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd54 offers itself to this sort
of analysis. The plaintiffs ran a photographic transparency lending library.
Following a telephone inquiry by the defendants, the plaintiffs delivered
to them 47 transparencies together with a delivery note containing nine
printed conditions. Condition 2 stipulated that all the transparencies had
to be returned within 14 days of delivery otherwise a holding fee of £5 a
day and value added tax would be charged for each transparency retained
thereafter. The defendants, who had not used the plaintiffs’ services before,
did not read the conditions and returned the transparencies four weeks
later whereupon the plaintiffs invoiced the defendants for £3,783.50. The
defendants refused to pay and the plaintiffs brought an action to recover
that sum. It was held that where clauses incorporated into a contract
contained a particularly onerous or unusual condition, the party seeking
to enforce that condition had to show that it had been brought fairly and
reasonably to the attention of the other party.
Following the reasoning in Andrews’ case and assuming the condition
had been brought to the claimant’s attention, it would have been open to
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the claimant in Interfoto to claim that the sum was intended as an
alternative to returning the transparencies within the given time frame
(i.e., return by one date with no charge, or return at a later date with a
charge). Banks will also be able to get away with excessively high charges
by maintaining that the customer had merely been given the alternative
of staying within the borrowing limit without charge or exceeding it with
a charge.
4.  SHOULD PENALTY CLAUSES BE UPHELD?
DUNLOP PNEMATIC TYRES THROUGH THE YEARS
We have so far taken a critical look at some of the issues thrown up by
the common law rule on penalties. Notably, the breach limitation creates
unfair results in commercial contracts and attempts to get around it have
only resulted in further confusion. It seems apt to commence this section
with an examination of Lord Dunedin’s propositions in Dunlop’s case
with the aim of probing if they continue to be good law for modern-day
contracts.
4.1 Sum in Terrorem Versus Genuine Pre-Estimate of Damage
The difficulty with Lord Dunedin’s proposition that “the essence of a
penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending
party and the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-
estimate of damage” is that it assumes that if a sum is not a genuine pre-
estimate, then its essence must necessarily be to terrorize the other party
into compliance. While this assumption is understandably a reflection of
the common law aversion to punishment in contract law, we must now
answer the question whether it is necessarily true and if so, whether this
is so great a mischief that must be prevented by the law. As far back as
1961, The English Law Commission commenting on this proposition
stated that it gives little guidance because contract law itself has a coercive
force, so it is not uncommon to find cases where the defendant feels bound
to perform a contract he would have preferred to break because of the
fear of damages.55  Furthermore, the sum (which this proposition assumes
is automatically a penalty because it is not a genuine pre-estimate) may
actually be less than actual loss suffered.
Conversely, liquidated damages may exceed the amount of actual
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loss and this fact may be known to the defendant before a breach occurs,
leading to the result that he is acting in terrorem despite the “genuineness”
of the estimate.56 Hence, Lord Radcliffe’s speech in Bridge’s case that
there are penalties where the defendant is not in terrorem but they still
deserve the protection of the courts nonetheless.57 It is the writer’s
argument that this simplistic distinction is no basis for the special
protection that the law seeks to give to parties with equal bargaining power
who make consensual commitments and stipulate the consequences for
breach.
Another important point to note is that since the case of Pneumatic
Tyres was decided, the notion of penalties has now been extended beyond
money payments. Thus, in Jobson v. Johnson,58 relief against penalty was
extended to a clause to transfer shares.
4.2 Extravagant and Unconscionable Amount in Comparison
with the Greatest Loss Conceivable from the Breach
This is one of the tests proposed in Dunlop’s case. It is clear from this
proposition that the principle of remoteness has some place in the common
law of penalties. There is some support for this position in Philip Hong
Kong v. AG of Hong Kong59 where the Privy Council stated: “… It is
also acceptable to take account of the fact that the actual loss was not
greater than the agreed damages even though the matter should be judged
as at the contract date, what actually happened can provide valuable
evidence as to what could have been reasonably expected to be the loss at
the time the contract was made”. Also, in the Nigerian case of Edem
Archibong v. Ephraim Duke,60 Weber J admitted that although a genuine
pre-estimate may be difficult to make at the time of contracting, it is
reasonable for parties to attempt to provide for liquidated damages as
long as it is not so disproportionate to a reasonable estimate.61  Much has
been said about the application of limiting factors to liquidated damages
and will not be repeated here.
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4.3 Sum Greater than the Sum, which Ought to Have Been
Paid  Under Contract
Lord Dunedin interestingly commented on this test that, “whether it had
its historical origin in the doctrine of the common law. That when A
promised to pay B a sum of money on a certain day and did not do so, B
could only recover the sum with, in certain cases, interest, but could never
recover further damages for non-timeous payment, or whether it was a
survival of the time when equity reformed unconscionable bargains merely
because they were unconscionable, is probably more interesting than
material”.62 The passage of time and the increased complexity of
commercial agreements have however revealed that it is indeed material.
There is a tension, if not an inconsistency, between this test and the
modern approach to interests.63
In the case of loans, increases in the rate of interest payable following
breach have been closely scrutinized. In Lordsvale Finance Ltd v. Bank
of Zambia64  where the loan agreements provided for an additional, but
unexplained, 1 per cent increase in interest in the event of default, the
court held that (i) there was no reason in principle why a contractual
provision should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the
circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided its
dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach; and
(ii) that the rate of 1 per cent could not be said to be in terrorem but was
consistent only with an increase in the consideration for the loan by reason
of the increased credit risk represented by a borrower in default.
4.4 Single Lump Sum on the Occurrence of One or More or
All of Several Events
The argument has been made that this is about what happens when a
single sum is payable on termination (calculated in terms of loss of bargain
damages) and the contract may be terminated for a minor or major
breach.65 This creates a tension between the proposition as expounded
by Lord Dunedin and what is commercially obtainable. In the Dunlop
case itself, this presumption was rebutted because although there were
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several ways in which tyres could be sold or offered in breach of the
agreement the loss likely to result from any such breach was difficult to
assess and £5 represented a genuine attempt to do so. Indeed, the relevant
question should be whether there has been a termination resulting in loss
and not the weight of the breach. On the other hand, it is no obstacle to
the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of damage, that the
consequences of the breach are such as to make precise pre-estimation
almost impossible. On the contrary, that is just the situation when it is
probable that pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between the
parties.66
His Lordship mentioned that it is just one of those cases where it
seems quite reasonable for parties to contract that they should estimate
that damage at a certain figure, and provided that figure is not extravagant
there would seem no reason to suspect that it is not truly a bargain to
assess damages, but rather a penalty to be held in terrorem. Even though
this test can be criticized for being vague and of little help to the courts
when faced with the less straightforward cases, it can be said to have laid
the foundation for flexibility now observed in more complex and
sophisticated agreements. Thus, in Philips Hong Kong,67 the Privy Council
upheld a clause in a road construction contract as a liquidated damages
clause. Lord Woolf considered that “the courts should not be too zealous
in knocking down clauses as penal. And that what parties have agreed
should normally be upheld … otherwise, it would render it so difficult to
draw up valid liquidated damages clause in complex commercial
contracts”. One can now see the principle of commercial justifiability,
necessity and reasonableness taking centre stage in more recent cases.
There is generally a reluctance of the courts to interfere in commercial
agreements, which are genuinely made for reasonable commercial purpose
and necessitated by commercial realities, without just cause. This
reluctance is not only observable in relation to penalty clauses and
liquidated damages. A very recent instance is the English case of Arnold
v. Britton,68 where the courts refused to deviate from the clear intention
of the lease in question despite the fact that it produced a ridiculously
unfair burden on the tenants. The president of the English Supreme Court,
Lord Neuberger closed his judgment in that case by stating: “there are
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various statutory provisions which protect tenants against unreasonable
service charges, but none of them apply here … there may be a strong
case for extending such provisions but that is a policy issue for
parliament.”69 Where there is an applicable legislation or not, it becomes
more difficult to justify an intervention when the parties are considered
to be of equal commercial standing and knowledge.
The treatment of exemption clauses further illustrates this shift in
reasoning. With the enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
(and very recently the English Consumers Right Act 2015), judge-made
restrictions to exemption clauses have gradually fallen away.70  More recent
cases have therefore paid attention to factors such as commercial
knowledge of the parties and understanding of how markets work.71 This
recognition of the fact that judges are not commercial persons and should
not undermine the security of transactions by trying to rewrite the
bargains of commercial parties is valuable.
The gradual pre-eminence of this notion of commercial justifiability
in penalty cases can be glimpsed from other cases like Lordsvale v. Bank
of Zambia72 considered above. In M&J Polymers Ltd v. Imerys Minerals
Ltd,73 the court in upholding a take or pay (minimum payment) clause
stated that it was commercially justifiable, did not amount to oppression,
was negotiated and freely entered into between parties of comparable
bargaining power, and did not have the predominant purpose of deterring
a breach of contract nor amount to a provision in terrorem. The court
decided that the take or pay provision did not offend the rule against
penalties and the claimant was entitled to recover the price of the shortfall.
In the very recent decision of the English Court of Appeal in Makdessi
v Cavendish,74  The court conceded that older authorities had approached
the issue as a dichotomy between a genuine pre-estimate of loss on the
one hand, and a penalty on the other. However, more recent authorities
show the courts adopting a broader test of whether a clause was
extravagant and unconscionable with a predominant function of
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deterrence and declining to consider it unenforceable where there was a
commercial justification.75  The major test for determining the predominant
purpose (whether commercial necessity or deterrence) is the question of
proportion. Where the sum is all out of proportion then it is open to the
court to conclude that the sum went beyond compensation and into the
territory of deterrence. It is interesting that the Australian courts are
increasingly making constant reference to conscionability and good faith
as the real basis for the penalty rule.76
Recent Nigerian authorities confirm that the principles laid down by
Lord Dunedin in Dunlop’s case still hold sway in Nigeria and the evolving
trend in common law jurisprudence which focuses on commercial
justification and predominant purpose has not been a great deal of
attention by Nigerian courts.77  The case of GChitex Industries v. Oceanic
Bank Intl,78  however, stands out. Although the main point for decision
in that case was remoteness of damages, Belgore JSC regarded
reasonability as the major factor in distinguishing between arbitrary and
genuine estimation of damages.79  While this suggests a move in a more
flexible direction, there is a need to move the law beyond the grey area of
“reasonableness” in this regard. In light of the fact that Nigeria is currently
experiencing a boom in foreign investment and there is a surge in novel
and sophisticated cross-border transactions, this is an important
consideration. Agreed damages clauses and their validity become
extremely important in cross-border transactions because parties are
understandably nervous to leave damage assessment courts of unfamiliar
territories.
Considering the issues that have been raised in the preceding sections
of this work, it is doubtful that the continued distinction between penalties
and liquidated damages is sustainable, at least in its original formulation.
Nonetheless, we are reluctant to admit of a new formulation as the solution
to the problems. This is because the rule has become unnecessary and
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there is more to be gained from its abolition than restatement in any
manner.80 As seen above, the dichotomy between penalties and liquidated
damages by Lord Dunedin using the idea of in terrorem is quite slender.
Commercial entities strive to navigate around penalty clauses.81  One of
the strongest arguments for liquidated damages is that it reduces the
likelihood of serious dispute between parties and saves time which is often
a precious, valuable commodity in business.82 However, it may be argued
that whatever time is saved by the recognition of agreed damages by the
courts is quickly lost in the process of making a determination (especially
in sophisticated and highly technical contracts) as to whether the sum is
indeed a penalty or liquidated damages.83 Our discussions here show that
this determination is almost never a straight forward one. It has become
increasingly riddled with gimmicks, manoeuvres and unsolved puzzles.
Persons in the anti-penalty school of thought, on the other hand, are
regarded as substantially unfair and inefficient as it makes parties stick to
uneconomical contracts.84 In answer to this, Burrows rightly notes that
the efficient breach theories ignore the possibility of bargaining around a
penalty clause.85 This happens quite often in commercial transactions, as
parties are wary of commencing lengthy and expensive litigation. It has
also been argued that penalties may incentivize a claimant to induce
breach.86 This point is readily deflated by the fact that this is only likely
to happen when the penalty is higher than the actual loss, which is not
always the case. Another anti-penalty argument is that punishment
belongs to criminal and not civil law; however, experience with the law
of torts shows that this is not completely true.87
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The case for upholding penalty clauses rests on the protection of the
principle of the freedom of contract. It is suggested that agreed damages
clauses should be prima facie valid subject to vitiating factors such as
undue influence and misrepresentation. This will encourage contract
making, ensure certainty and reduce litigation costs. Also, with the
initiation of protective legislations such as the Unfair Contract Terms
Act,88 the danger which that the penalties rule seems so eager to curb
may be exaggerated. Another argument for abandoning the dichotomy
is that the law is arbitrarily selective in its application.
The legal treatment of forfeiture of monies paid deserves some
attention here. It is clear that one of the purposes of such deposits is to
secure complete performance of the payer’s obligations under the contract,
yet the courts will normally uphold the forfeiture clause except in some
rare cases where relief against forfeiture is granted.89 The difference
between forfeiture and penalty clauses seem merely cosmetic, i.e., deposits
are paid in advance while penalties are payable only on breach, after the
contract has come to an end. The effect of both payments are however
similar.  A forfeiture clause can also be regarded as imposed in terrorem
and worse still, the payee can sue for damages in spite of the forfeiture.
Regarding the sale of land, for instance, the common law as a matter of
practice allows a 10 per cent deposit and would uphold its forfeiture.90
This sum seems arbitrary and there is no basis to show that it is a genuine
estimate of loss.
From theoretical, historical and practical perspectives, the common
law of liquidated damages and penalties leaves us with many unanswered
questions; it is unclear what the courts ought to do with the limiting
factors like mitigation and remoteness, what the reaction of the courts
should be when actual loss suffered is greater than the so called penalty
and whether courts should stick to the breach limitation despite the
unpleasant results it yields. Clearly, it is becoming more difficult to justify
the incursion into the freedom of contract that the dichotomy demands.
This is especially true for commercial contracts between equal parties
that have competent advisers. Commercial contracts in reality often
2015 PENALTIES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN A CHANGING WORLD 269
91 The English Unfair Contract Terms Act1977, the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999 ( this is based on an EU Regulation which is in force
in the member countries of the EU) and the Consumer Acts Right 2015.
involve series of negotiations between parties, knowledgeable legal and
financial advisers will likely conduct risk assessments and tear every clause
apart before the parties finalize a deal.
The major function of agreed damages is the avoidance of dispute
and ease of compensation for non-performance. Additionally, it could
also serve as security against non-performance. Whether commercial
parties decide to construct their agreed damages clause to perform the
function of compensation or they build a collateral element into it to
protect their bargains should not call for judicial intervention. What is
important is that the clause represents the legitimate intention of the
parties. The courts hardly interfere in other legitimate contractual attempts
by parties to insulate themselves against the risk of non-performance and
we argue that agreed damages clauses should be no different.  The reason
why commercial parties agree damages in their contracts is to avoid a
third party assessment of what they consider adequate compensation for
breach. This is to save time and also achieve the legitimate expectations
of the parties from their agreements.
The commercial justification test is perhaps a better test because it
focuses on achieving commercially sensible outcomes. It is agreed that
two responsible judges can hold opposing views on what is commercially
justifiable in different situations. This becomes even more difficult as
contracts become more complex, multi-layered and multi-jurisdictional.
It is albeit an easier path to thread than attempting to assess damages in
such situations.  However, what may be more efficient is to remove the
blanket rule against penalties where equal commercial parties are
concerned and reserve the commercial justification test for cases of
extreme unreasonableness.
Most of the arguments in this work focus on commercial entities with
equal bargaining power but we do not deny that there are deserving cases
for intervention. A case may be made for situations where there is no
such equality. Contracts between big corporations and consumers who
have little or no room for bargaining will fall within this exception. This
is not a novel proposition, as consumer welfarism has informed legislation
in some jurisdictions thereby limiting protection to those who really need
it.91
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While the common law world awaits specific legislation on penalty
and liquidated damages, the courts would do well to treat equal parties as
equal in this area. If the law is to display true commitment to the
performance of obligations, especially those made between parties of equal
bargaining power and sophistication, the rule against penalties must
become an exception and not the rule. Continued application of the
penalty rule to contracts between commercial parties will only be a case
of one giant using the law as a weapon to bully his way out of a legitimate
and binding promise to another. And as Olatawura JSC stated in the case
of Kusfa v. United Bawo Construction Co,92 the law should not assist
parties to break their contracts with impunity.
5.  CONCLUSION
This article has engaged in a critical analysis of the common law dichotomy
between penalties and liquidated damages. The basic propositions laid
down in Dunlop’s case have undergone severe modifications in today’s
commercial world. The dichotomy remains, but the lines have become
ever blurry and confusing. Out of commercial necessity, courts have
shifted focus to questions of commercial justification, reasonableness and
fairness. This article has addressed how these evolving tests also create
problems of their own. The liquidated damages/penalty rule is not only
unnecessary in commercial contracts, it is problematic. This article has
raised the difficult questions: Are commercial parties really terrorized by
the prospect of paying penalties? Are they really entitled to enlist the
court’s protection when they are called upon to make good on their
promises?
Legislation designed to protect consumers and parties susceptible to
economic oppression can render the rule against penalty redundant, as a
general rule. But beyond that, the rule may breed more confusion than it
did in the past as courts strive to achieve commercially sensible results
by applying a commercial justification test. This article strongly advocates
an abandonment of the common law dichotomy between penalties and
liquidates damages in commercial contexts. In many jurisdictions,
legislative reform has been used to modify the common law of contract
92 [1994] 4 NWLR (pt. 336) 1.
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such that specific protection is given to those who need it.93
It is doubtful that the matter will soon be resolved in such a decisive
manner under Nigerian law as contract law is typically not an area dealt
with by legislative action.94 However, it is not unthinkable that Nigerian
judges (despite being faithful to long standing principles of common law)
also show commitment to achieving commercially sensible results. This
is evident in some of the cases considered in this article, which show an
inclination towards the commercial justification test. At this point, a
surgical break from the hold of the age-old dichotomy may not be on the
front burner of Nigerian law reform. However, with the exponential
increase in multijurisdictional commercial transactions, financial
innovations and complex contractual arrangements, there is reason to
believe that this change may come sooner than later. Passage of the Unfair
Contract Terms Bill 2010 into law and anticipated legislative reform in
other jurisdictions are factors that are likely to influence the pace of reform
in this area.
93 S1 (1) of the Penalty Clauses (Scotland) Bill available at <www.scotland.gov.uk/
Publications/2010/07/penalty-clauses> accessed 7 October 2015. The Scottish
Government consulted on the draft bill in July 2010 and the Scottish Law
Commission believes there is merit in further reform. See
<www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/law-reform-projects/contract-law-in-light-of-the-
draft-common-frame-of-reference-dcf/>accessed 7 October 2015 ;  The US
Uniform Commercial Code also provides a platform for extensive reform to
contract law in the United States; Interestingly, The English Law Commission in
1975 mentioned the enforcement of both liquidated damages and penalties as
one of the possible reform steps but quickly ruled out this possibility without an
explanation. It is perhaps as a result of the reluctance to unsettle deeply rooted
principles of common law. However, recent decisions in the UK would suggest
movement in a different direction.
94 Note that there is a (Consumer) Unfair Contract Terms Bill 2010 which has not
been passed into law.
